Підтримати
En
Пошук
Підтримати
En
Про ГО УІМК

Analytical Note by UMCI: Responsibility of Russian Propagandists for Spreading Propaganda of War, Hatred, and Disinformation. An Overview of Ukrainian Initiatives

post-image
The analytical note contains an overview of the current initiatives seeking a way to bring Russian propagandists to liability and an analysis of challenges and problems in this sphere. In addition, it offers recommendations for key Ukrainian stakeholders and can be useful for further discussions, research, and policy decision making that can help trigger processes to bring perpetrators to justice.

Author: Halyna Budivska

Introduction

Russia has been spreading anti-Ukraine propaganda for a long historical time period. Starting from 2014, propaganda has been the driving force behind the annexation of the Crimea and the war that Russia has begun against Ukraine: first in the east, and since February 2022 — blatantly and openly — against the entire country. 

In other words, this entire time, propaganda has been an integral part of the Russian aggression. First, it prepared the basis for the war, and then it adapted the public discourse to the reality of the war and its objectives. As analyzed by experts of the StopFake.org fact-checking project, during the first three months of the full-scale war, the propaganda narratives changed from “rescue” of the Ukrainian people from the “Kyiv regime” to the need to “punish” the entire nation allegedly “infected” with the “plague of Nazism.”

Russia has ensured a “stable support” to war aggression by means of propaganda.  According to Levada Center, as of December 12, 2022, 81% of Russians supported Vladimir Putin’s activities as the president of Russia. The level of approval remains high when it comes to the Prime Minister (71%), the government (68%), governors (72%) and the State Duma (57%). Overall, the statement that things are going well in the country, and Russia is moving in the right direction is supported by 63% of its population.

The dictatorial regime has formed the environment of unconditional trust from the Russian population to the regime and support for the ongoing war due to the government-controlled media and suppression of the freedom of speech. At the same time, soft power and propaganda through state international broadcasting in the West has reinforced Vladimir Putin as an omnipotent leader of the regime, has influenced public opinion abroad, and weakened the support for Ukraine.  

This influence was strengthened by sustained use of entire disinformation networks on social media. For instance, in the fall of 2022, Meta blocked the activities of a network that had been active throughout the summer. The network encompassed hundreds of bot profiles on Facebook and Instagram, as well as more than 60 websites imitating well-known media outlets. Fake social media profiles were used to spread links to fake news reports, pro-Russian posts and videos on social media platforms including Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and Telegram. Fake messages included allegations that footage from Bucha was entirely faked by Ukraine.

Russia and its president Putin justified their military aggression against Ukraine by the so-called “denazification,” which was essentially the extermination of Ukrainians. In the article What Russia Should Do with Ukraine that came out on April 3, 2022, Russian political technologist and propagandist Timofey Sergeytsev speaks about “maximum physical destruction of Ukrainian Nazis on the battlefield” and ideological repressions and censorship against “some part of the people masses” (so-called passive Nazis). Another Russian media person, Anton Krasovskiy, appeared on RT in October 2022, urging the viewers to drown and burn Ukrainian children. This statement seemed too harsh even to some representatives of the Russian elites, but on December 17, 2022, the Main Investigative Department of the Investigative Committee of Russia in Moscow, in response to a Moscow city councilor’s inquiry, stated that there was no crime in Krasovskiy’s words.

These calls for murder as well as continued and systematic work of the propagandists inciting inter-ethnic hostility cannot go unpunished. The examples of the Nuremberg tribunal against the Nazis and the Rwanda one against the founders and employees of the Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) demonstrate that eventually, liability for genocide and crimes against humanity catches up with the perpetrators, including so-called journalists (see this and this). 

In Ukraine, the subject of bringing Russian propagandists to justice has become all the more acute since the full-scale invasion. On March 10, 2022, in his address, President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that Ukraine would find a way and push for bringing to justice propagandists for complicity in war crimes alongside those who “drop bombs on civilians.”  And the first step towards this named by the President was sanctions — confiscating the property of propagandists and those tied to them.  

On September 6, 2022, the Parliamentary Committee on Social Policy and Protection of Veterans of Ukraine appealed to the global community to bring Russian propagandists to justice. “The information criminals of Russia, who systematically manipulate mass consciousness by spreading narratives against the peace and security of humankind, call for murdering of the Ukrainian population and justify the war crimes of Russia in Ukraine, should be punished on a par with war and military criminals,” said the Committee’s appeal. 

Subsequently, numerous Ukrainian stakeholders, including government agencies, NGOs, the media, lawyers, and scholars, brought up this issue on various platforms. 

On November 2, 2022, the Ukrainian Media and Communication Institute, together with CEDEM, Human Rights Platform, and Digital Security Lab and with the support from the American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative (ABA ROLI) held an international online conference “Legal and Ethical Grounds for Liability of Russian Propagandists for Spreading Propaganda of War, Hatred, and Disinformation”. The conference raised the following important issues: 

  • Should and will Russian propagandists bear legal and ethical responsibility for inciting hatred against Ukrainians? 
  • What mechanisms of bringing them to justice can be applied in accordance with the national and international law?
  •  What tools and methods can facilitate limiting the spread of propaganda and disinformation on the Internet, particularly on social media?  

This event became one of the first and most visible activities among Ukrainian stakeholders on this matter, as well as a starting point for further discussion and quest for solutions. 

One year after this event, this analytical note aims at: 

  • providing an overview of the current initiatives among Ukrainian stakeholders seeking a way to bring Russian propagandists to justice;
  • analyzing the challenges and issues that are in the way of bringing Russian propagandists to justice; 
  • based on the analysis of current initiatives, as well as of the challenges and problems, come up with recommendations for key stakeholders in Ukraine. 

The analytical note consists of the introduction and three sections. It does not aim to be exhaustive, but it outlines the state of the art and can be useful for further discussions, research, as well as political decision making that may help launch the processes to bring the guilty to justice. 

The proposed conclusions and recommendations can be taken into account by the government of Ukraine and of other countries, by NGOs, lawyers, and journalists. 

1. Bringing Russian propagandists to justice. Overview of the activities initiated by Ukrainian stakeholders. 

During 2022 and 2023, a lot of work in terms of bringing Russian propagandists to justice was done by NGOs, government agencies, lawyers, and other related parties. Such activities included:

  • monitoring of Russian information channels for genocidal rhetoric and disinformation in order to record and document possible information crimes; 
  • bringing the issue of responsibility of Russian propagandists to the forefront, discussing it at Ukrainian and international platforms, such as conferences, forums, round tables, press conferences etc.;
  • analytical materials and research;
  • production of educational and training content.

Below is an overview of the most notable activities of Ukrainian stakeholders. The overview is structured by the sector to which the organization/institution belongs. 

1.1. Non-governmental organizations

1.1.1. The Ukrainian Institute of Media and Communication held a conference on bringing Russian propagandists to justice 

One of the first events dedicated to the need to bring Russian propagandists to justice, with the participation of Ukrainian and international experts, was the international conference “Legal and Ethical Grounds for Liability of Russian Propagandists for Spreading Propaganda of War, Hatred, and Disinformation” held on November 2, 2022, by the Ukrainian Media and Communication Institute, together with CEDEM, Human Rights Platform, and Digital Security Lab and with the support from the American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative (ABA ROLI). 

As for the key conclusions of the conference, many experts emphasized different aspects of responsibility of the propagandists: legal, ethical, and economic. Direct war criminals would face criminal justice per national and international legal mechanisms. Channels that disseminate propaganda, disinformation, and hate speech can and should face sanctions in the form of blocking and fines. 

Media and journalists spreading war propaganda, disinformation and hate speech should be imposed with ethical and professional liability, which may include expulsion from international professional associations. An example of this is the expulsion of the Russian “Public Panel on Complaints against the Press” from the Alliance of Independent Press Councils of Europe. 

This was preceded by a number of events — most notably, on October 21, 2022, the Ukrainian Commission on Journalistic Ethics announced termination of its membership in the Allianceof Independent Press Councils of Europe. The Commission explained that Russia’s participation in this Alliance “raises doubts aboutthe Alliance`s ability to meet the declared goals and contradicts the values of ethical journalism” taken as guidelines by the Commission. Later on, organizations of nine countries quit the Alliance as a token of solidarity with Ukraine. 

The participants of the conferences noted that in order to counter disinformation on social media platforms, it is necessary, alongside fact-checking, to use algorithm-driven restrictions on spreading disinformation. This, however, requires greater awareness of the problem by the platforms themselves, their greater investment into moderation, and better self-regulation practices. Given the growing global influence of social media platforms and their monopoly position, it is necessary to develop legal regulation of their activities at the national and international levels alongside with establishing the rules at a company level. 

You can read more about the conclusions of the conference in several materials published by the UMCI (available here, here, and here). 

1.1.2. The Digital Security Lab analyzed the mechanisms of prosecution for disinformation under international law

At the end of 2022, the “Digital Security Lab” CSO, supported by IMS, published the analytical report For Whom the Bell Tolls: Liability for Disinformation During the War, wherein the authors TetianaAvdieieva and Maksym Dvorovyi studied the legal status of disseminating false information during an armed conflict. They conducted a detailed overview of the norms and mechanisms of international human rights law, international public law, and international criminal law that pertain to the phenomenon of disinformation. They also analyzed the place of disinformation in the context of other existing concepts, including war propaganda, hate speech, incitement to genocide, calls to violate the territorial sovereignty of states. Based on the analysis of historical examples, the authors outlined possible legal countermeasures to disinformation during an armed conflict. 

Based on the analysis of historical cases the DSL experts produced a number of recommendations pertaining to international public law, international human rights law, and international criminal law which Ukraine should follow in order to hold Russia and the participants of coordinated disinformation campaigns during the war against Ukraine liable per international law. The recommendations go about, inter alia, initiating procedures in the UN Human Rights Committee against Russia for the failure to fulfill its duty to refrain from war propaganda; diplomatic efforts and communication with UN member states about adopting a resolution on setting up an international criminal tribunal against Russian propagandists; constant cooperation with the ICC and providing proper evidence of crimes against humanity etc. 

1.1.3. The Institute of War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) held a press conference on bringing Russian propagandists to justice.

On March 14, 2023, the Institute of War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) held a press conference “Bringing Russian Propagandists Who Publicly Call for Genocide of the Ukrainian People to Justice.” The participants included journalists, media experts, and lawyers. The event focused on the issue of whether information criminals would be punished and what had already been done to this end. 

Aliona Nesterenko, a media expert of the Institute of Mass Information and a researcher of propaganda and disinformation, shared about the efforts her organization was doing to fight propaganda. The organizationdocuments Russia’s genocidal rhetoric against Ukrainians, studies the components of the Russian plan of genocide against Ukrainians (“filtration, forced deportation etc.”), publishes a series of materials about the information crimes of key Russian propagandists and overviews social media, etc. 

Maksym Dvorovyi, a lawyer at the Digital Security Lab, outlined the possible mechanisms of bringing propagandists to justice within the scope of international law — however, this is a “very long” story, he said, and “you should not expect anything in ten or even fifteen years.” According to the lawyer, there are certain obstacles on the way to real solutions, and progress in this case is possible on the assumption of sustainable and complex work in the legal and diplomatic fields. At the same time, LiudmylaPankratova, a member of the Independent Media Council, executive director of Regional Press Development Institute CSO, a media lawyer and a defense attorney, spoke about the possibilities that the Ukrainian law provides in terms of liability for war crimes. 

1.2.4. The President of Ukraine and the National Security and Defense Council

Important measures on bringing Russian propagandists to justice include personal sanctions against them. Back in 2022 the sanctions were introduced mainly against Russian military, politicians, and business representatives, in early 2023 the sanctions were used directly against propagandists from the spheres of television, music, cinema, and other similar sectors. By means of decrees as of January 7 and as of January 15, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy enacted the decision of the National Security and Defense Council to impose sanctions on Russian artists and propagandists, including singers Irina Allegrova, Larisa Dolina, Filipp Kirkorov, Mikhail Shufutinskiy, Vladimir Presnyakov, TV hosts Dmitri Kiselyov and Leonid Yakubovich, film maker Nikita Mikhalkov, and many others. Sanctions also affected some people with Ukrainian passports, for instance, the host of theMedvedchuk’s TV channels Diana Panchenko, who used to be the author of propaganda materials in support for Russia.

The sanctions are imposed for a 10-year time period and include economic and other restrictive measures, such as freezing of assets, termination of trade operations, ban on privatization and lease of state-owned property etc.

1.2. Governmental bodies 

In the context of governmental bodies` efforts, the Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine does the most important work in regards to collecting evidence of Russia’s war crimes. As for the information realm, Russian disinformation is recorded by the National Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting. In addition to the aforementioned bodies the following institutions tackle the issue of accountability for disinformation:

  • Center for Strategic Communication and Information Security (established under the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine as a mechanism to counter disinformation through joint efforts of the government and civil society); 
  • Center for Countering Disinformation under the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine.

Below, we provide an overview of well-known initiatives in the sphere of justice for propaganda and disinformation. Some of the activities are carried out jointly by several government bodies or in cooperation with non-governmental organizations, which can be called a positive trend in coordinating the efforts of various actors. 

1.2.1. The Center for Strategic Communication and Information Security hosts experts at Kyiv Stratcom Forum 2023

In March 2023, the Center for Strategic Communication and Information Security held Kyiv Stratcom Forum — a two-day on-site event, which aimed at sharing experiences and improving approaches to strategic communication, as well as forming resilience on the state level in Ukraine and in the NATO country-partners in Eastern Europe. One of the panels was dedicated to the subject of criminalizing Russian propaganda and, as some of the above-mentioned events, discussed the issue of whether Russian information criminals would be brought to justice. The panel was attended by Ben Heap, the head of Ukraine Stratcom Partnership project of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, by Igor Solovey, the head of the Center for Strategic Communication and Information Security, by YevhenFedchenko, director of Kyiv-Mohyla School of Journalism and editor-in-chief of StopFake, by Oleksandr Melnychenko, a representative of the Information Security Department of the Security Service of Ukraine, by Oksana Romaniuk, the executive director of the Institute of Mass Information CSO, and program director of the Detector Media CSO. The panelists agreed that there is currently no international consensus on this issue, so Ukraine needs to work hard, communicate clearly, and gather evidence for future trials. 

1.2.2. Center for Countering Disinformation under the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine (NSDCU) together with the National Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting documents hate speech of Russian propagandists

The Center for Countering Disinformation under the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine is a coordination agency on national security and defense under the President of Ukraine; it can thus be assumed that not all the activities of the Center are publicly visible; instead, they primarily facilitate the activities of the the National Security and Defense Council and of the President of Ukraine. 

However, it is worth noting their crucial activities on analyzing Russian narratives and information influences, as well as documenting Russia’s disinformation and propaganda. For instance, together with the National Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting, the Center for Countering Disinformation regularly publishes a digest of hate speech by Russian propagandists. The digest helps to identify the leading disinformation narratives and also records quotes containing hate speech. 

1.2.3. The National Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting is a key body that collects evidence of war crimes of information nature

The National Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting, in addition to the aforementioned digest of hate speech, which is implemented jointly with the Center for Countering Disinformation under the NSDCU, delivers a number of other activities that play a key role in the future prosecution of Russian propagandists. For instance, the National Council carries out regular monitoring and analysis of the content of Russian TV programs and coordinates its activities on recording and analysis of Russian disinformation with other government agencies in Ukraine. 

The National Council also cooperates with civil society organizations. For instance, in 2023, experts of the Ukrainian Media and Communication Institute held a webinar for analysts of the National Council on the use of artificial intelligence systems while collecting and making analysis of information, and also gave their expert feedback about the Council’s several analytical materials related to Russian disinformation. 

1.3. Media 

Ukrainian media also tackle the issue of bringing Russian propagandists to justice. In addition to news occasions in the form of politicians’ statements or events regarding this issue, Ukrainian media publicize history research, interviews with lawyers, with Ukrainian and international experts etc. 

We should also note the active position of the Ukrainian media regarding this issue. In September 2022, the association of Ukrainian media, journalists, andCSOs“Mediarukh” (“Media Movement”), following the Association of Polish Journalists, appealed to international journalist organizations with a call for punishment of Russian propagandists. 

2. Challenges and issues that are in the way of bringing Russian propagandists to justice 

Challenges and problems of bringing Russian propagandists to justice are tied to legal and geopolitical limitations. In the legal context, experts point out the need to seek a real and viable mechanism of bringing to justice, the complexity of proof in cases of information crimes (particularly calls for genocide). In addition to legal difficulties, there are certain political, or rather geopolitical ones, which require long and complex diplomatic work — otherwise, it will be impossible to have real trials resulting in punishment of information criminals of the war. 

Based on expert statements and analytical papers which we have analyzed, below is an overview of the problems and limitations that occur on the way of bringing Russian propagandists to justice. 

2.1. Legal challenges and legitimacy

When it goes about legal regulations, experts agree that currently at the level of national legislations here are no limitations in criminal prosecution of incitement of hatred, genocide or other war crimes.  In Ukraine, Article 442, part 2 of the Criminal Code envisions up to five years in prison for public calls for genocide, as well as for producing and disseminating materials with such calls. Such criminal provisions can be applied long before the establishment of an international tribunal. 

At the same time, national legislation has significant limitations. While the International Criminal Court can hold a trial only in the presence of the accused,national legislations, including the Ukrainian one, also envisions so-called convictions “in absentia.” It would be unlikely to satisfy society’s demand for punishment of information criminals. 

Another limitation noted by lawyers is the difficulty of proving the cause-effect relations in the context of international public law. Proceedings can also be launched for calls for war crimes, but decisions are made based on the content of a call, on the author of a call, on the intended audience etc. According to international lawyers, in the case of a genocide crime, it is important to document not only who speaks but also to add explanations and contextualize these statements for international experts. 

In addition to the legal aspect, experts point out the legitimacy of the future tribunal. They mean that a tribunal set up by the UN General Assembly would have a greater level of legitimacy than the one set up within the European Union. The first case would help to avoid criticism from the Global South, but it requires long and complex diplomatic work with the countries of Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. 

2.2.  Other challenges 

Some experts, particularly lawyers, warn that establishing an international tribunal against Russian war criminals in general, and in particular against the information criminals, is a process that will take a very long time. Based on some predictions, results are unlikely to be achieved within ten or even fifteen years. 

Accordingly, alongside the efforts on establishing an international tribunal or looking for other viable mechanisms in the framework of the international law, it is necessary to undertake measures that would enable fines and sanctions against propagandists as ways of restricting the information aggression.

Recommendations

Taking into account the presentations of experts who joined the conference held by the Ukrainian Media and Communication Institute and partners, as well as based on the analysis of current activities aimed at finding the methods of bringing Russian propagandists to justice, we propose recommendations for various stakeholders that operate in Ukraine and beyond. 

For journalists and the media:

  • Demand the exclusion of Russian agencies, organizations, and their representatives from international organizations, such as the Alliance of Independent Press Councils of Europe. In case of their refusal to do so, boycott such international organizations.
  • Raise awareness of the international journalist community about the Russia-Ukraine by telling the truth to colleagues. 
  • Create “an industry of the truth” in response to “the industry of lies” (since debunking alone does not work). 
  • Document the actions of Russian propagandists.
  • Facilitate the development of the audience’s critical thinking. 

For digital platforms:

  • Invest more in moderation with the participation of people who know the local context.
  • Invest in studying the dynamics of disinformation and propaganda.
  • Develop better protection mechanisms so that users can protect themselves, their rights and complain about platforms that violate standards. 
  • Alongside fact-checking use mechanisms of limiting the outreach of propaganda.
  • Different tech companies should cooperate and jointly track the activities of bot networks, since they spread in many ways and on different platforms. 
  • Establish partnerships with local organizations: use their expertise, research, and datasets while also share access to platforms` data to enable independent research. 

To governments:

  • Develop anti-disinformation legislation.
  • Impose sanctions and fines on propagandists.
  • Criminalize calls for genocide, war propaganda, and other war crimes.
  • Introduce new and/or support current educational programs on development of people’s information and media literacy. 

To civil society organizations in Ukraine and abroad:

  • Engage in a dialogue with digital platforms, convey the need to work on better solutions to bring propagandists to justice.
  • When interacting with tech giants, learn as much as possible about their policies and principles, explain why (and which) disinformation is a violation of their standards.
  • Work with governments and researchers to document propagandists’ crimes. One possible focus may be creating a unified methodology to document such acts.
  • Work on developing the audience’s critical thinking skills and media literacy.

To researchers: 

  • As experts, join the work of government agencies and civil society organizations, particularly in regards to development of a unified methodology of documenting propagandists’ acts.

Sources

The analytical note has been developed within the project of the Ukrainian Media and Communication Institute “Protecting the Information Safety of Citizens in the Circumstances of War and Disinformation” supported by the American Bar Association’s Rule of Law Initiative (ABA ROLI) in Ukraine within the project “Promoting Internet Freedom in Ukraine.”

Коментарі