

ANALYTICAL NOTE

OVERVIEW OF MEDIA PROJECTS ON COUNTERING DISINFORMATION IN UKRAINE DURING THE FULL-SCALE WAR

Kyiv / 2024






American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative (ABA ROLI) is an international development program promoting justice, economic opportunity and human dignity through the rule of law. ABA ROLI increases public understanding of and respect for the rule of law and the role of the legal profession; promotes the best quality legal education, competence and ethical conduct.

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UMCI is an independent educational center and a think tank which conducts media researches; makes analysis of media processes and their impact on politics and society; provides competent recommendations and proposes viable solutions in the sphere of media and communications; serves the ground for expert discussions and as a knowledge hub for journalists and the public.

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Overview of Media Projects on Countering Disinformation in Ukraine During the Full-Scale War. Analytical Note. — Civil Society Organization “Ukrainian Media and Communication Institute”, 2024

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The analytical note is prepared by CSO “Ukrainian Media and Communication Institute” with the financial support of the American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative (ABA ROLI in Ukraine) within the “Promoting Internet Freedom in Ukraine” program.



This analytical note contains an overview of Ukrainian media projects which are mainly focused on countering Russian disinformation and propaganda. It also offers recommendations to upgrade the role of the Ukrainian media in the process of countering Russian disinformation.

Taken the growing discussions about the role of the Ukrainian media in countering Russian disinformation, as well as a certain drop in trust between Ukrainian editorial offices and various public authorities and state institutions [Ukrainska Pravda, 2024; the Ukrainian Media and Communication Institute, 2024a], the Ukrainian Media and Communication Institute (UMCI) decided to do an overview of the content produced by the Ukrainian media in Ukraine to counter disinformation. We believe this will help to assess the Ukrainian media's contribution into the information fight against Russia while finding any gaps or issues necessary to be resolved.



METHODOLOGY



This report is based on the information collected by means of a desk research in June 2024, i.e., it did not contain the field work of empirical data collection. It also contains the results of the discussions held by journalists, experts, and representatives of public authorities (in terms of recommendations) that took place during the multi-stakeholder roundtable “The Role of the Media in Countering Disinformation During the War: Between Safety and Freedom. How to Boost Effectiveness” organized by CSO “Ukrainian Media and Communication Institute” on July 3, 2024 together with the National Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting with the support of the American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative (ABA ROLI in Ukraine) [Ukrainian Media and Communication Institute, 2024a and 2024b].

The goal is to provide an overview of media projects on countering disinformation created by national and regional Ukrainian editorial offices.

Objectives:

- to get a general idea of the media projects on countering disinformation;
- to identify key trends in the media market based on the overview of selected projects;
- to identify key problems in the media sector in the context of countering disinformation;
- to propose possible solutions to identified problems.

In general, the following has been analyzed:

63 national media outlets
(31 online media, 17 TV channels,
and 15 radio stations);

57 regional media outlets (33 online
media, 8 radio stations, 13 TV chan-
nels and YouTube channels of three
Suspilne branch offices).

The following parameters of media projects on countering disinformation were analyzed:

- formats and genres;
- subject matters;
- focus / tasks they resolve;
- audience;
- funding sources.



Period: February 24, 2022, to June 2024.

Media selection criteria:

the list of media analyzed by the experts of the CSO UMCI primarily included media that are part of the “white list” of the Institute of Mass Information [IMI, 2024] and the Map of Recommended media of Ukraine [CSO Detector Media, 2024]. The outreach of media outlets was also taken into account (Similar-Web analytics; USAID/Internews 2023 media consumption survey results [2023]): the media with greater outreach were included into the list.

Certain difficulties that arose in the process of analyzing the collected information related to the thematic structuring of the projects. Some of them were at the cross-cut of media literacy and countering disinformation.

The analysis has the following limitations:

- it is not exhaustive (i.e., not all the media were included in the analysis);
- it does not include projects in English or other foreign languages meant for the Western audience (apart from the English-language column by Texty.org.ua outlet and texts by Kyiv Independent outlet).

The analysis does not intend to describe specific projects of all the media included in the list, but only to review trends.

SUMMARY



GENERAL FINDINGS

1. Before the full-scale Russian invasion in 2022, most private media, including the oligarch-owned ones, did not demonstrate any interest in the subjects of media literacy and countering disinformation. These subjects were mostly handled by independent media with the support of international donors. However, they could not compete with large TV channels when it came to audience outreach.
2. After the full-scale Russian invasion, the issue of countering disinformation became one of the key ones for Ukraine’s national security. This automatically made the issue apparent for all Ukrainian media.
3. Since February 24, 2022, national and regional media have produced a broad range of media products dedicated to media literacy and countering disinformation. The UMCI carried out an overview of **63 national media outlets (31 online outlets, 17 TV channels, and 15 radio sta-**

tions) and 57 regional media outlets (33 online outlets, 8 radio stations, 13 TV channels and YouTube channels of three Suspilne branch offices).

4. Out of the media outlets reviewed by the UMCI, more projects on countering disinformation are implemented by editorial offices from Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Presumably, this is due to the fact that the war in these regions has been ongoing since 2014, and that these regions have been constantly undergoing Russia's aggressive information influence.
5. Most of the reviewed media outlets produced relevant content in one form or another. The reviewed national media outlets implemented 103 various projects on countering disinformation, of which 65 are produced on a regular basis (that is, repeated with certain frequency and endure over time). The overviewed regional media created 55 projects, including 35 ones on a regular basis. Essentially, this means that every editorial office creates roughly 1–2 projects aimed at countering disinformation, in addition to relevant content in the news.
6. News feeds on websites, or news on TV or radio also contain the subject of countering disinformation in various forms, including “as a background,” when experts in the studio can, for instance, discuss various subjects and then, among other things, share some reports on fake news and provide recommendations how to identify them.



CONTENT

7. Video content aimed at countering disinformation dominates in the national media while text content prevails in the regional media. And yet the media outlets also actively work in audio formats, particularly by recording podcasts. Radio NV offers perhaps the largest spectrum of podcasts on countering disinformation and promoting media literacy.
8. The media projects that counter disinformation are presented in different genres. This includes the standard news format when it comes to debunking of fakes, or interviewing when something has to be explained to the audience. There are, however, also more complex genres, such as reportage, analytical articles, documentary series (such as the Big Russian Lie series by Suspilne), overviews etc. Some formats are not commonly found in the media, such as lessons on media literacy for schoolchildren (for example, Cherkasy media or the 1+1 TV channel conduct such lessons).
9. Humorous and satirical projects that cover, inter alia, debunking of fakes enjoy special success among the audience. However, experiments with humorous content do not always comply with the best practices. Such content may include hate speech, misogyny, sexism, racism, and other negative attitudes to various social groups, including the conflict-sensitive ones, such as internally displaced persons (for example, the Commission on Journalistic Ethics made a critical statement about certain releases of the “Kvartal 95 Studio” TV show).
10. Both national and regional media are mainly focused on the topics of war and military operations as key subject matters of the projects on countering disinformation. In regional media, the focus shifts towards the topic of military draft. The issue of Ukraine's domestic policies is on the second place. The subjects of culture and history covered by the national media, and local issues covered by regional media outlets are on the third place.

11. While producing their projects, the media outlets engage a large number of different experts (fact-checkers, media literacy experts, psychologists, historians, sociologists, cybersecurity experts etc.). Regional media also often invite professors of regional journalism departments to participate in the commentary.
12. The projects included in the overview were largely aimed at fact-checking. While national media typically verify and debunk fakes on their own, some regional media re-publicize information from a variety of sources, including from the national media. Most media also use materials of the Center for Countering Disinformation or the Center for Strategic Communication. The media also focused on debunking of historic and cultural myths, conspiracy theories etc. In regional media, a lot of attention is paid to information hygiene (various advice on media consumption, hate speech etc.). Another part of the media projects was aimed at increasing the level of digital literacy and cybersecurity. On the other hand, the media paid little attention to the subject of artificial intelligence.



THE AUDIENCE

13. The overview of media projects testifies to the fact that video content enjoys the largest outreach, as opposed to text formats. The leaders among videos are humorous projects. However, it should be noted that a large outreach does not necessarily demonstrate a high level of the impact of these media projects on the audience, the latter's behavior with the media, or level of critical thinking. We cannot conclude that the entire audience (even if these numbers reach millions) who watched a certain piece of content now can clearly tell the difference between disinformation and the truth, or can ignore information provocations, or, in general, can be responsible information wise.
14. Most of the media projects were designed for a broad adult audience (in the case of national media) or local adult audience (in the case of regional media). However, there are too few products aimed at children and teenagers.




FUNDING/SUSTAINABILITY

15. Most of the projects on countering disinformation became possible due to the support of international donors. The media, especially regional ones, are not yet ready to invest their resources (human and financial) in the production of the content that does not generate immediate revenue. This is confirmed by the fact that media projects on countering disinformation last only as long as they have donor funding.
16. After the full-scale invasion, the funding landscape of the projects on countering disinformation and on media literacy changed. Before 2022 international donors avoided funding the media products that would be created by large (oligarch-owned) media groups. After 2022, this

partnership became possible, which led to the emergence of relevant media products, for instance, on the channels of such media groups as 1+1 and Starlight Media, which automatically expanded their outreach.

17. The key donors of the media projects on countering disinformation (the ones included in this overview) are usually the European Union, USAID (through the Media Program in Ukraine implemented by the international Internews Network), MATRA (the Netherlands), the US Embassy in Ukraine (through the Media Development Fund), the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), IREX, and others.
18. None of the projects reviewed by the UMCI was funded either in full or in part by the Ukrainian non-media business. The native advertising, with the elements of digital and media literacy in some media outlets can be considered as an exception.



After the Russian full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022, the media landscape of Ukraine underwent significant transformations. One of these key transformations was that the dominance of oligarchic media holdings and their TV channels disappeared and the role of the Public Broadcasting Company / Suspilne strengthened. Another transformation consisted in a rapid change of media consumption trends — the audience turned to social media, particularly Telegram, to obtain information. In addition, due to the Russian occupation of Ukrainian territories, multiple regional media had to relocate or close.

Ukrainian media were formerly reluctant to tackle the subject of Russian disinformation despite the fact that Russia's war against Ukraine has been going on since 2014. As a rule, it was the prerogative of Ukrainian civil society organizations.

In 2021, the Ukrainian Media and Communication Institute carried out a mapping of media literacy projects in Ukraine [Ukrainian Media and Communication Institute, 2021]. The analytical report, based on the findings, indicated that before the full-scale invasion, oligarchic media did not show interest in the subjects of media literacy and countering disinformation. These subjects were mostly handled by independent media, which had the opportunity to implement such projects thanks to the support of international donors. But they could not compete with large oligarch-owned channels in terms of audience outreach. Therefore, the visibility of such media projects before the full-scale invasion remained insignificant, hence, presumably, their impact was just as much.

However, after the full-scale invasion in 2022, the issue of media literacy and countering Russian disinformation became one of the key aspects of national security and gained special importance at the state level. This automatically made the problem apparent to the Ukrainian media.

OVERVIEW OF MEDIA PROJECTS



GENERAL INFORMATION

While analyzing the available data, the UMCI experts noticed a large variety of media projects aimed at countering Russian disinformation, which emerged following the full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022. Overall, the reviewed national media outlets have implemented 103 various projects on countering disinformation, of which 65 ones are on a regular basis (that is, repeated with regular frequency). The overviewed regional media created 55 projects, including 35 ones on a regular basis. Essentially, this means that every editorial office creates roughly 1–2 projects aimed at countering disinformation, in addition to relevant content in the news.

However, these projects were not easy to find due to their low visibility on media platforms. Most websites do not have a dedicated section or tags that could help with finding relevant projects, apart from regular TV programs, such as Anti-Zombie (ICTV), Chronicles of the Information War with Olha Len (Espresso) or others; or apart from specific media, for which fact-checking is one of the main focus areas (such as the Kharkiv outlet Gwara Media — <https://gwaramedia.com>). This means that **projects created, for instance, a year or half a year ago, even if they currently remain important and acute, are not easy to access by the audience (the audience would need to be aware of them and intentionally look for them).**



FORMATS AND GENRES

In most online media under review, the subject of disinformation is constantly present in the newsfeed. It is also regularly present on the radio and TV news. Essentially, the point is to respond fakes and disinformation disseminated by Russia about the ongoing news picture of the day in an attempt to influence Ukraine's information environment. The media that stream their broadcasting (television and radio channels) periodically cover the issues of fakes, countering Russian disinformation, information security or media and digital literacy in their talk shows with various experts. Overall, all media engage to discussions / commentary representatives of the civil society sector and of public authorities, scholars, fact-checkers, psychologists, historians, sociologists, cybersecurity experts.

Journalists of various editorial offices debunk fakes. They also actively share news from the Center for Countering Disinformation (National Security and Defense Council) and from the Center for Strate-


gic Communication (Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine), or from international fact-checking organizations (if the news in question is global). Both Centers intensified their work in this area, especially since 2023, which is reflected in another report of CSO UMCI “Effectiveness of Countering Russian Disinformation in Ukraine During the Full-Scale War” [Ukrainian Media and Communication Institute, 2023].

The genres of media projects to combat disinformation are quite varying. This is not just news formats, which were covered above. This also includes interviews when something needs to be explained to the audience. There are, however, also more complex genres, such as reportage, analytical articles, documentary series (such as the Big Russian Lie series by Suspilne), overviews etc.

There are also unusual media formats, such as media literacy lessons for schoolchildren. For example, in Snidanok z 1+1 (“Breakfast with 1+1”) there is a section on information literacy “Anti-Fake Lessons with Yehor Hordieiev” — these are meetings of school children with an expert. During the conversations in these meetings children learn to identify and counter disinformation (video is available at https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLMYx-PjEL8hum9dCOG-lFaNddNzPHWp_f).

Journalists of Cherkasy media (Vycherpno, ZMI.ck.ua, Dzvin.media, VIKKA TV channel, “Procherk”, Suspilne Cherkasy, “18000”) together with professors of journalism, advertising, and PR department of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi Cherkasy National University, conduct on-site media literacy classes for local high-schoolers [2024].


The editorial office of Texty.org.ua publishes research-based long-reads. This outlet specializes in big data analysis, including subjects related to Russian propaganda and disinformation.



↑
Suspilne Filmed a 6-Episode Documentary Series “Big Russian Lie”

Texty.org.ua offers a weekly subscription to analysis of propaganda and disinformation in Russian media


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Дезінформонітор від Texty.org.ua
Щотижнева аналітика пропаганди і дезінформації у російських ЗМІ
Launched 3 months ago

Type your email...

No thanks >



Podcast "You did Conspire" was created by Radio NV jointly with "Citizen+" civic education platform with the support of the German Foreign Ministry. In the 5-episode podcast, journalists and experts discuss the nature of conspiracy theories.

Video content dominates in the national media, while text content prevails in the regional ones. All media also actively work in audio formats, including podcasts (this format is cheaper to produce than videos). Radio NV has collected on its platform what is perhaps the largest range of podcasts on countering disinformation and promoting media literacy. The editorial office publishes educational podcasts both of its own production and from partner organizations (e.g., "Russian Fake: Knocking from Beyond the Bottom" by Detector Media CSO, or "Life in the Display Cabinet" created by The Ukrainians outlet jointly with the international organization IREX).



UNIAN's weekly satirical show Balalaika Stories are published in Russian. In the show, journalists satirically comment on the week's events, primarily the statements and actions of the Russian regime.

The weekly show "Getting to Know Damn Russians" hosted by Mykola Veresen came out on the ESPRESSO TV Channel since the beginning of the full-scale invasion. A total of 90 episodes were released. However, on June 14, 2024, the TV channel announced the suspension of the show due to financial reasons.



The audience especially enjoys humorous and satirical projects that, inter alia, cover the issue of anti-fakes. However, experiments with humorous content do not always correspond with the best practices because such projects may include hate speech, misogyny, sexism, racism, and other negative attitudes to various social groups, including conflict-sensitive ones, such as internally displaced persons (for example, the Commission on Journalistic Ethics made a critical statement about specific releases of the “Kvartal 95 Studio” TV show [Commission on Journalistic Ethics, 2024]).

Also, the key messages of such projects may look relatively dubious. For example, they often disparage the capabilities of the enemy, and the viewer gets the impression that it is very easy to beat an enemy like that. However, we believe this was acceptable at the early stages of the full-scale invasion, when it was crucial to dehumanize the enemy and raise the morale and belief in victory. Today, such messages create a distorted idea of the capabilities of the Russian army and lead to an unrealistic assessment of the situation, which later affects many other processes in the country, including the attitude to military draft.

In addition, **such programs, while debunking certain myths and stereotypes, may spread other ones, cause additional split in society or insult entire groups of people. Therefore, the effectiveness of such programs in countering disinformation needs additional study.**




FOCUS (TASK THEY RESOLVE) AND SUBJECT MATTERS OF THE MEDIA PROJECTS

The projects that were included in the overview were largely aimed at fact-checking (with a difference between national and regional media). While national media often verify and debunk fakes on their own, some regional media re-publicize information from a variety of sources, including the national media. Most media also use materials of the Center for Countering Disinformation or the Center for Strategic Communication. The media outlets also focused on debunking historic and cultural myths, conspiracy theories etc. In regional media, a lot of attention is paid to information hygiene (various advice on media consumption, hate speech etc.). Another part of the overviewed media projects was aimed at increasing the level of digital literacy and cybersecurity. **At the same time, the media paid little attention to the topic of the role of artificial intelligence in creation or debunking of disinformation.**

As for the subject matter, national and regional media predictably focus on the war and hostilities in a broad context (the truth about Russian war crimes, debunking fakes and myths like “Ukrainians were bombing the Donbas for 8 years” or “Ukrainians shell themselves” etc.). In regional media, the focus was shifted towards military draft (as of June 2024, when experts were analyzing the projects — authors’ note), which was due to the adoption of the new law on military draft. The issue of Ukraine’s domestic policies comes in the second place. The subject of culture and history comes in the third place (for instance, Suspilne Chernihiv has a video project Old Streets, New Names, which covers the stories of street names in the city). Historical projects often debunk the myths of Soviet propaganda. These include the series of documentaries Real History with Akim Halimov produced by the TV channel 1+1. Local problems are also on the third place in regional media.

Some projects (such as the aforementioned Balalaika Stories satirical show by UNIAN or the regional show Know the Truth by Donbas News info agency) are **in Russian.**



The decommunization project Old Streets, New Names is produced by journalists of Suspilne Chernihiv.



COOPERATION

There is a relatively new trend that should be noted, namely cooperation between civil society and editorial offices, as well as cooperation between various editorial offices. Just a few years ago, this was impossible due to intense, negative competition. However, the conditions in which all stakeholders found themselves after the full-scale Russian invasion, as well as the favorable donor situation (encouraging the aforementioned cooperation during the calls for projects), created a proper environment for the cooperation.

For example, the Format Lab team from the National Media Association [filmed](#) 29 short videos with experts on the topic of wartime stereotypes in the spring of 2022. The project was called Naspravdi (“Actually”), and it was broadcast by several regional TV channels.

One of the largest examples of the cooperation in 2023-2024 is the Smart Angel`s project “Comprehensive information and awareness campaign against disinformation”, wherein such media groups as 1+1 media and Starlight Media, leading media organizations of the civil society sector and state institutions working in the field of countering disinformation joined their efforts. In total, 29 media products of various genres were created within this project, including documentary films and series, training courses on media literacy and cybersecurity, video stories and even content for children and teenagers. Their overall outreach via digital resources was 125 million, views via TV channels — 55 million. This became possible because large television channels with traditionally large audience joined the project.



THE AUDIENCE


The overview of media projects indicates that video content in contrast to text formats has the largest outreach. The average number of views of one video episode or video program can be 200-300 thou-

sand while the audience of one text in national media is 10 thousand readers on average, and in local media — from 2 thousand and above. Humorous projects often lead among videos.

However, it should be noted that a large outreach of video products does not necessarily testify to the level of their influencing the audience, its behavior with the media, or its level of critical thinking. We cannot conclude that the entire audience (even if these numbers reach millions) who watched a certain piece of content now can clearly tell the difference between disinformation and the truth, or can ignore information provocations or, in general, can be responsible in terms of information.

Most media projects were meant for a broad adult audience (in the case of national media) or for local adult audience (in the case of regional media). However, **there are too few products aimed at children and teenagers.**

There are media that actively interact with their audience. One good example is the Kharkiv media outlet Gwara Media. Their chatbot “Verification” has processed over 94 thousand inquiries from users who submitted news for verification.



FUNDING

Most of the projects on countering disinformation were made possible (already traditionally) due to the support of international partners. Media outlets, especially regional ones, are not yet ready to invest their resources (human and financial) in the production of content that does not generate immediate revenue. This is confirmed by the fact that most media projects on countering disinformation (with some exceptions) last as long as they have donor funding.

After the full-scale invasion, the funding landscape of the projects on disinformation and media literacy changed. Before 2022 international donors avoided funding the media products that would be created by large (oligarch-owned) media groups. After 2022, this partnership became possible which led to the emergence of relevant media products, for instance, on the channels of media groups 1+1 and Starlight Media, which automatically expanded their outreach.

The key donors of media projects on countering disinformation (the ones included in this overview) are usually the European Union, USAID (through the Media Program in Ukraine implemented by the international Internews Network), MATRA (the Netherlands), the US Embassy in Ukraine (through the Media Development Fund), the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), IREX, and others.

None of the projects reviewed by the UMCI was funded either in full or in part by the Ukrainian non-media business. The native advertising, with the elements of digital and media literacy in some media outlets can be considered as an exception.



UNRESOLVED ISSUES



1

There are no studies (and therefore no methodology) on measuring the real impact of numerous media projects onto the audience and on the audience's behavior change. Absence of such studies hinders the development of a strategy for countering disinformation at the national level rather than of stand-alone projects.

2

The distribution of responsibilities between different stakeholders (Government, media, civil society) in regards to countering disinformation remains unaddressed, which leads to mutual complaints and accusations, resulting in a loss of trust in each other hence playing right into the enemy's hands.

3

In the Ukrainian media, projects on countering disinformation co-exist with the media content that can decrease the level of the audience's critical thinking as well as of resilience to information influences (for instance, one and the same channel may broadcast shows debunking the role of astrologers / tarot readers / fortune-tellers and at the same time, broadcast programs that promote astrologers / tarot readers / fortune-tellers).

4

Oftentimes Ukrainian journalists' low level of media literacy as well as their lack of understanding of both Ukrainian and global contexts lead to the publication of materials that may play into the hands of Russian propaganda (for instance, one of the regional channels titled the material that debunked fakes about concentration camps in Ukraine as "A Concentration Camp Set Up near Odesa for Ukrainians Who Refuse to Fight at War").

5

Insufficient communication by government representatives about conflict-sensitive topics limits the media's ability to cover a certain subject comprehensively.

6

Lack of visibility of many projects for different audiences reduces a projects' potential impact on the audience.

RECOMMENDATIONS



To editorial offices / journalists / civil society organizations

1. Establish continuous trainings for journalists (about ethics, standards, fact-checking, verification of information sources, etc.), especially when it comes to young employees or those who joined a media outlet without a journalistic education.
2. Develop policies on countering disinformation and on covering difficult subject matters in war-time conditions.
3. Develop security protocols for editorial offices and journalists (including issues of physical security, cybersecurity, etc.).
4. Study your audience and engage with them to understand their needs in the wartime environment.
5. Create projects for children and adolescents, as well as for adults, on how to communicate with children and adolescents about media literacy and countering disinformation.
6. Create projects for other vulnerable audiences, including the elderly.
7. Promote your own projects aimed at media literacy and countering disinformation, facilitate their visibility to various audiences.
8. When producing humorous/satirical programs, involve experts on countering disinformation in order to avoid negative impact on the audience and the dissemination of distorted narratives.



To government agencies

1. Strengthen the communication about conflict-sensitive subjects of public importance.
2. Simplify the process of responding to editorial offices` requests for information on various issues in order to promptly respond to events and Russian information interventions.

3. Expand the pool of speakers who can professionally communicate with the media on various acute issues.
4. Establish a training process for employees of information and communication units, both on countering disinformation and on interaction with the media.







To international organizations/ donors

1. Support media research aimed at studying disinformation and propaganda in Ukraine, its impact on the audience, behavioral reactions of the audience, etc. It is important to ensure a continuous research process because the information environment constantly changes, and so does the behavior of the audience.
2. Support projects on countering disinformation in Ukraine for vulnerable audiences, including children, teenagers, and the elderly.
3. Support projects related to learning/studying new media technologies and artificial intelligence.



A proposal from the Ukrainian Media and Communication Institute regarding the distribution of roles in the field of countering disinformation

UMCI experts believe that the cooperation between various stakeholders in the field of countering disinformation would be more effective if there was a clear distribution of and taking on the roles between and by the media, the state, and the civil society sector. This would promote greater understanding and help making their efforts coordinated. Therefore, during the multi-stakeholder round table, the UMCI proposed the following role matrix for discussion:

 <p>THE STATE / PUBLIC AUTHORITIES / THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Strategy ■ Coordination ■ Regulation / co-regulation ■ Legislation ■ PSYOPs 	 <p>MEDIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Fact-checking ■ Compliance with ethics and standards in covering all topics ■ Creation of media products in different formats for different audiences ■ Self-regulation
 <p>CIVIL SOCIETY</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Research ■ Expertise ■ Education (development of courses, workshops, etc.) ■ Raising awareness 	 <p>BUSINESS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Direct funding of anti-disinformation projects ■ PSAs ■ Commercials ■ Non-financial support of social projects

According to Oleksandr Burmahin, a member of the National Council of Ukraine on Television and Radio Broadcasting, the distribution of roles in the system of countering disinformation will primarily depend on the level of media regulation: “If the media choose self-regulation, then the state interferes minimally and can help with some expertise. This is how European countries mostly counter disinformation. Since 2018, the Code of Practice on Disinformation has been in effect in the EU (it was updated in 2022 — ed.). The Code was signed by digital platforms and associations of journalists. In the National Council, we did a thematic review and found out that Lithuania is the only EU state that has a legally defined term ‘disinformation.’ But this does not mean that there is no countering disinformation in Europe [at the state level]. Our colleagues from the civil society sector did a research and saw that regulators in the UK, Moldova, Baltic States may assess the objectivity of news. I doubt that Ukraine would willingly grant such powers to the National Council. But this is a possible option if self-regulation is not enough to effectively counter disinformation. There is an intermediate link between state regulation and self-regulation — co-regulation, which is still in the development stage after the adoption of the Law ‘On Media.’ We can consider how a countering disinformation pattern would work in this format. If we choose regulation, it should be transparent.”



SOURCES



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2. Institute of Mass Information (2024). White list: 11 media of the highest quality.
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
«**Effectiveness of Countering Russian Disinformation in Ukraine in the Full-Scale War**» is an analytical report which offers a review of recent scientific studies in the sphere of countering propaganda and disinformation. The report also presents the results of a sociological survey of citizens on their opinion about the efforts of the governmental institutions in countering Russian disinformation, as well as offers the analysis of the efficiency of the projects in this area from the point of view of key stakeholders.

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«**Map of Risks for Personal Digital Identity**» is an analytical report on the legal, reputational, psychological and safety risks for personal digital identity of Ukrainian citizens in the conditions of digital transformations. The report is based on the analysis of the experience of the professionals from the communications related spheres as well as on the assessment of the risks from experts in different spheres.

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«**Responsibility of Russian Propagandists for Dissemination of War Propaganda, Hatred and Disinformation**» is an analytical note with an overview of current initiatives about the ways of bringing to justice the Russian propagandists. The note also presents an analysis of the challenges about the initiatives.

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OVERVIEW OF MEDIA PROJECTS
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DISINFORMATION
IN UKRAINE**
DURING THE FULL-SCALE WAR

